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1. Introduction. 
 
 Tariff-jumping FDI allows a foreign firm to avoid a trade barrier by locating production 
within the destination market.  Such activities can thereby substantially mitigate welfare 
consequences of the original trade protection policy.1   Theoretically, the likelihood of tariff-
jumping FDI for a given trade barrier and the magnitude of its effect on welfare of various agents 
depends on a number of factors, including differential production costs, relocation costs, other 
entry barriers, and demand conditions.  As Smith (1987) shows for simple monopoly and Cournot 
duopoly markets, “tariffs may or may not induce foreign direct investment, they may or may not 
change market structure, and they may have pro- or anti-competitive effects.” 2 (p. 96)  
While trade economists find none of the above controversial, it is surprising how often 
tariff-jumping is ignored in the academic literature, particularly in the case of strategic trade 
policy.3  An exception is a theoretical literature that examines the consequences of tariff-jumping 
FDI  where governments understand the connection between trade policy and FDI and act 
strategically.  Ellingsen and Warneryd (1999) find that the optimal tariff for a government 
concerned about domestic producers is one that is just low enough so that FDI does not occur.  In 
addition, VERs may be preferred to tariffs since VERs provide quota rents to the foreign firms,  
making FDI less likely.  In contrast, Brander and Spencer (1987) show conditions under which a 
country with unemployment may wish to induce FDI by setting differential taxes on imports and 
local production.  Flam (1994) examines the ambiguity of trade policy determination with 
                                                          
1  There are only rare exceptions where countries apply tariffs to foreign firms, regardless of whether they export to 
the country or have production in the country.  
2  Motta (1992) extends Smith’s (1987) analysis, by allowing for potential entry by domestic producers and finding 
an even wider array of possible outcomes and welfare effects.  
3 For example, Levinsohn (1989) shows how the literature on the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas in the 
presence of imperfect competition often hinges on the assumption that a quota leads to no foreign supply response, 
which is false if tariff-jumping FDI is possible.   A second example is the sparse mention in the literature of the large 
FDI response by Japanese automakers when assessing the market and welfare effects of the U.S. automobile VER, 
though Berry et al. (1999) is an important exception to this. 
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potential FDI for a government such as the European Union (EU), where some members have 
domestic production and others do not.  Finally, Haaland and Wooten (1998) examine optimal 
government trade policies with potential FDI in the context of a two-country reciprocal dumping 
model.  These latter two papers present a wide variety of possible equilibrium outcomes 
depending on initial conditions and the nature of the strategic game.  
Given this wide range of theoretical market outcomes and welfare consequences, the 
empirical evidence on tariff-jumping FDI and its welfare consequences in the context of trade 
policies is an important issue.  Yet the profession has done little to estimate tariff-jumping 
responses or its welfare consequences.  Indeed, only a few papers have systematically examined 
tariff-jumping FDI occurrences, and none have tried to estimate its welfare implications in any 
dimension.  Recent papers that have empirically examined tariff-jumping FDI include Belderbos 
(1997), Blonigen and Feenstra (1997), Barrell and Pain (1999), which focus on Japanese firms’ 
responses to antidumping (AD) trade protection in the U.S. and the EU.  For various levels of data 
aggregation, these studies consistently find substantial tariff-jumping responses.  In contrast, 
using a more comprehensive dataset of all firms subject to U.S. AD duties, Blonigen (2002) finds 
much smaller average tariff-jumping responses and concludes that tariff-jumping is only a 
realistic option for multinational firms from industrialized countries.  
A number of papers have estimated the welfare consequences of trade policies, 
particularly AD protection, but do not address the effects of tariff-jumping FDI.  Murray and 
Rousslang (1989), DeVault (1996) and Kelly and Morkre (1998) use computable partial 
equilibrium models to examine welfare consequences of dumping (and AD) for separate U.S. 
cases.  Gallaway et al. (1999) estimate the collective welfare effects of all U.S. AD duties as of 
1993 and find a substantial $2-$4 billion annual loss from these trade policies.  None of these 
studies considers tariff-jumping FDI in their estimates. 
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Most closely related to our study, Hartigan et al. (1989), Mahdavi and Bhagwati (1994), 
and Hughes et al. (1997) use event study methodology to examine the consequences of AD 
investigation events and announced duties on domestic firms’ profits.4  Hartigan et al. (1989) 
examines non-steel U.S. AD petitions in the early 1980s and finds statistically significant effects 
on domestic firms’ profits, but only when the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) 
ruled that there was a threat of “injury” to the domestic industry, not when they ruled that actual 
injury had occurred.  Mahdavi and Bhagwati (1994)  and Hughes et al. (1997) examine events 
surrounding the trade protection actions related to the U.S. semiconductor industry in the mid-
1980s, which began with a series of AD investigations on various types of semiconductor chips.  
Mahdavi and Bhagwati find a negative stock market reaction to the AD investigation, but positive 
effects of the concluding Semiconductor Agreement of 1986 that supplanted any AD duties. 
Hughes et al. find positive effects of the Semiconductor Agreement for both the U.S. producers 
and the downstream consumers of semiconductors.  They attribute positive impacts to 
downstream consumers coming from the benefits of having a strong, innovative domestic 
supplier.  Neither of these studies considers tariff-jumping FDI responses which, in particular, 
occurred with substantial magnitude in the semiconductor industry. 
In this paper, we take the next step of addressing the impact of tariff-jumping FDI on 
welfare consequences of trade policies.  Due to data considerations, our focus is on the welfare of 
domestic firms which apply for import relief under U.S. AD laws.  Unique firm-specific data 
from U.S. AD cases allows us to focus on tariff-jumping FDI consequences for domestic firms’ 
profits and compare that with the initial domestic profit effects from the imposition of the AD 
duty.  For many U.S. AD cases, both the set of AD investigation events (from petition to 
                                                          
4  Other examples of studies using event methodology to examine the impact of trade policies on domestic firm 
profitability include Hartigan et al. (1986) that examined U.S. escape clause petitions, Lenway et al. (1980) that 
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imposition of the duty) and the foreign firm’s decision to locate production to the U.S. are 
publicly-announced events in prominent media outlets.  Using these announcements in 
conjunction with stock market returns data, we employ an event study methodology that allows 
estimation of  profit consequences for publicly-traded domestic firms involved in these AD cases. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section describes the AD investigation 
process in the U.S.  Section 3 details our empirical results from estimating stock market reactions 
to AD and related tariff-jumping announcements using event study methodology.  Our second-
stage analysis of the factors that affect the magnitude of these market reactions, including our 
hypothesis that tariff-jumping FDI mitigates the gains domestic petitioners experience from AD 
protection, is described in section 4, while section 5 highlights our main findings and concludes. 
 
2. A Brief Overview of U.S. AD Investigations. 
The U.S. AD laws are administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) and 
the USITC, each with distinct roles in the process.  An investigation begins, when a petition is 
filed with both agencies by an “interested party” that represents the domestic industry connected 
with the product named in the investigation.  Interested parties may be domestic firms, labor 
unions, a trade association, or the USDOC itself, but is typically one or more domestic firms in 
the industry. 
When a petition is filed, the USDOC’s role is to determine whether the subject product is 
being sold at “less than fair value” in the U.S.  Specifically, they calculate whether firms 
exporting to the U.S. are selling the product in the U.S. at less than “normal” or “fair” value, 
which is generally defined as the foreign firm’s own home market price for the same good.  For 
each case, the USDOC calculates an ad valorem dumping margin equal to the percentage 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
examined various trade policies connected with the steel industry in the late 1970s and 1980s.  Ries (1993) examines 
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difference between the U.S. transaction prices they observe and “fair value”.  The USITC 
concurrently determines whether the relevant U.S. domestic industry has been materially injured, 
or is threatened with material injury, by reason of the imports subject to its investigation. 
 The USDOC and USITC each make preliminary and final determinations for each case.  If 
an affirmative preliminary determination is made by both the USDOC and the USITC, then the 
importer must post a cash deposit, a bond or other security for each entry equal to the preliminary 
margin determined by the USDOC.  This requirement stays in effect until either the USDOC or 
the USITC makes a negative final determination.  If an affirmative final determination is made by 
both the USITC and USDOC, then the USDOC issues an AD order to levy a duty equal to the 
estimated dumping margin on the subject product.  When a subject foreign product enters the 
U.S., the importer must pay U.S. Customs a cash deposit equal to the margin times the value of 
the subject product.   
In all cases, the USDOC finds a nonnegative dumping margin by virtue of the 
methodologies they use to calculate the dumping margins (see Murray, 1991).  Thus, the main 
information received from the USDOC decision is the magnitude of the dumping duty should the 
case be ruled affirmative.  The real hurdle for a final affirmative decision in the case, leading to 
imposition of AD duties, is the USITC final determination.  The USITC ruled affirmative in their 
final decision in only about 40% of the cases from 1980-1993 (USITC, 1995, p. 3-1). 
On a final note, AD cases can be terminated or suspended before a final decision is made 
by the USDOC and USITC.  Terminations may occur for a variety of reasons, from insufficient 
grounds for an AD petition to a decision by the domestic petitioners to no longer pursue the case, 
possibly due to a private settlement with the foreign firms (see Prusa, 1992).  Suspensions occur 
when the domestic and foreign parties agree to a suspension agreement to resolve their dispute, as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the market effects for Japanese automakers and their suppliers from the 1981 U.S. VER on Japanese autos. 
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occurred with U.S. AD cases in semiconductors when the 1986 Semiconductor Agreement was 
signed between the U.S. and Japan. 
 
3. First-Stage Analysis: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Our empirical analysis is in two stages.  In this section, we employ an event study 
methodology to estimate abnormal stock returns for publicly-traded firms from announcements of 
our focus events: AD investigations and tariff-jumping FDI.  In the second stage analysis, which 
we present in section 4 below, we estimate determinants of these first-stage abnormal returns 
obtained from our event study methodology.   
The hypotheses we explore in this section are that 1) AD duties will lead to gains in 
domestic firms’ profits, and 2) tariff-jumping FDI by the foreign rival will mitigate these gains 
(i.e., lead to loss in domestic profits).  There are a number of issues that may complicate the 
testing of these hypotheses.  The first hypothesis is quite straightforward, particularly for AD 
cases which are initiated by domestic firms themselves, and which presumably would not petition 
for AD duties unless they expected positive profit gains from the action.  Although government 
agencies make the ultimate determination of the case, AD actions allow little or no voice for 
consumer groups or other agents in the economy in the investigation.  Thus, it is clear that the 
trade action is solely intended to benefit the domestic producers. 
The second hypothesis, at least the magnitude of the tariff-jumping FDI effect, is perhaps 
less straightforward.  Foreign firms’ competitive advantages may have been largely connected 
with location advantages in their own country.  Tariff-jumping may be preferred to exporting, but 
the foreign firm’s ability to compete may be nearly as diminished once it tariff-jumps as if they 
were to continue exporting.  For example, Dofasco and Co-Steel started a joint-venture steel mill 
in Kentucky in 1995 in response to the 1992-93 U.S. steel cases against imported steel from 
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Canada and other import sources.  By 1998, the joint venture had never turned a profit and Co-
Steel was trying to sell its $600 million share (Canadian Press Newswire, April 24, 1998).  In a 
similar vein, U.S. Department of Commerce (1993) reports that U.S.-owned ball bearings plants 
were approximately three times more profitable  from 1987-1991 than foreign-owned ball 
bearings plants in the U.S. (9.0% return on assets versus 2.3%), many of which had recently 
located in the U.S. due to AD duty cases. (p. 47)  In fact, from a strategic game-theoretic 
viewpoint, one might suspect that domestic firms would not petition for relief if they believe 
harmful tariff-jumping FDI will occur: i.e., to the extent that we see tariff-jumping, it is in cases 
where the domestic industry calculated that the AD actions will not be substantially mitigated.  
This obviously assigns substantial information and rationality on the part of the domestic firms.  
In addition, government agencies, not domestic firms, determine the level of the import barrier in 
AD cases and may set it “too high”, leading to tariff-jumping FDI that is harmful to the domestic 
firms. 
 
3.1. Methodology and Data. 
To test these hypotheses, we first employ an event study methodology that estimates 
abnormal stock returns for firms from public announcements of our focus events after controlling 
for general market movements. Thus, assuming the stock market is efficient, we estimate the 
market model:  
                                                                                                  (1) R Rit i i mt it= + +α β ε
where Rit is the return on security i on day t, Rmt is the market return on day t, and git is the zero 
mean disturbance term. Rmt is the broad-based stock index for the market portfolio, the S & P 
500 index.  
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Equation (1) is estimated for each firm using daily returns 300 days before the event 
through 45 days before the event. We then estimate abnormal returns (ARiJ) in our event window 
for firm i. Abnormal returns will be indexed in event time using J. Using the market model 
parameter estimates from equation (1), we define ARiJ for firm i as: 
                                                                (2) AR R Ri i i iτ τ α β= − −$ $ mτ
where J measures time relative to the event date, J= 0.  Thus, assuming efficient markets, the 
abnormal return represents the market’s valuation of the change in the firm’s current and future 
expected profitability due to the announced event.  An event window typically includes the event 
day and the day after the event to allow the information to be fully incorporated into the firms’ 
return.  In addition, the window includes days before the event to allow for possible leakage of the 
event’s outcome to some investor’s.  The cost of extending the window is the possibility of other 
unrelated events confounding the estimated abnormal returns for the focus event (i.e. a firm’s 
quarterly earnings announcement could confound the results). For our event window, we use a  
3-day window, which includes the day before, the event day, and the day after, but also consider 
the sensitivity of the results by examining 1-day, 5-day, 7-day and 9-day windows.  
In order to draw inferences for the focus events, the abnormal return observations must 
be aggregated. Using the estimated abnormal return for each day of the event window, we 
generate a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each firm i and event j:  
                                                                             (3) CAR ARij ij
l
L
=
=
∑ τ
τ
where l is the first day in the event window and L is the last day in the event window.  Hartigan 
et al. (1986) notes that testing for statistical significance of CARs is potentially problematic due 
to the possibility of autocorrelation in the series of abnormal returns. Given that all the abnormal 
returns use the same intercept (") and slope ($) parameters, serial correlation may occur. 
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Following Hartigan et al. (1986) and Ruback (1982), our variance estimate includes an 
adjustment for this first-order autocorrelation.5 
 We run this first-stage estimation procedure for two types of events.  The first type is the 
AD investigation events which are comprised of five events (in the chronological order they 
follow in U.S. AD cases): 1) the initial petition by the domestic firms, 2) the preliminary decision 
by the USITC, 3) the preliminary decision by the USDOC, 4) the final decision by the USDOC, 
and 5) the final decision by the USITC.  Figure 1 presents the timeline of AD case events for a 
standard case. 
It is important to note that for our sample we expect that the five AD events should 
primarily yield positive (or, at least, non-negative) abnormal returns for petitioning firms.  Firms 
would not petition without expectations of positive gains.  In addition, all cases in our sample are 
cases in which the preliminary AD decisions are ruled affirmative, and many are cases for which 
the final AD decisions are also ruled affirmative. As described below, we include some cases 
where the final USITC was negative or the case was terminated/suspended when there was tariff-
jumping announcements connected with these non-affirmative cases.  We control for these non-
affirmative decisions in our regressions.  
The magnitude of the effect of these AD announcements on the market depends on how 
much additional information they reveal.  The petition is the first event that begins the 
investigation and likely has a surprise element for the market.  However, the gains are realized by 
the domestic firms only if the petition will be successful.  Thus, uncertainty of the final outcome 
may mitigate the size of gains from a petition.  The USITC preliminary injury decision is almost 
                                                          
5 Typically, it is assumed that there is no overlap in the event window of the included securities, hence ARiJ and 
CARij will be independent across securities. This assumption will cause the covariance terms in the variance to go to 
zero. Therefore, the standard error for the CAR is obtained by summing the standard errors over the event window 
and dividing by the square root of the number of days in the event window (MacKinlay, 1997).5 By allowing for 
serial correlation, the covariance terms will be greater than zero.  
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always affirmative, as it must occur within 45 days of the petition and only has time to 
incorporate information presented by the domestic industry in their petition.  Thus, this event may 
not convey much new information to the market.  The preliminary USDOC decision is almost 
always affirmative as well.  However, this USDOC decision includes preliminary dumping 
margins which provides information to the market of the eventual size of AD duties should the 
final case decision be ruled affirmative.  The USDOC final dumping margin determination comes 
out 75 days later in a standard case.  While significant changes can occur in the dumping margin 
from preliminary to final stages, they tend to be highly correlated.6  Thus, for many cases, the 
final USDOC may not convey very much new information.  The final AD case event is the 
USITC final decision which, if affirmative, leads to imposition of AD duties.  One would expect 
this event to have quite a bit of potential to elicit market reactions because it resolves any 
uncertainty about the final outcome of the case. On the other hand, as the last event of the case, 
many months after the petition in the case, the market may have reasonably certain information 
about how the case will be determined.  In our results below, we report CARs for all of the five 
separate investigation events, as well as a CAR for the combination of the five events.  The 
second type of events for which we estimate CARs, which is novel in the literature, is tariff-
jumping FDI announcements.   
Our sample data consists of all publicly traded U.S. firms that were petitioners in U.S. 
affirmative AD cases between 1980 and 1995.  Of these 138 firm-case observations, 44 (32 
percent) saw one or more foreign firms locate production in the United States in the product 
subject to the AD investigation.  There were also a handful of U.S. AD cases that were not ruled 
affirmative, but nevertheless saw tariff-jumping FDI.  We include these additional firm-case 
observations in our sample. 
                                                          
6 In our sample, the correlation between preliminary and final USDOC margins was 0.64 and significant at the 1% 
 10 
Blonigen (2002) identifies all instances of FDI connected with U.S. AD investigations 
from 1980 through 1995 and these data also indicate the type of FDI that occurred (i.e., 
acquisition, new plant, joint venture, etc.).7  Using this list, we compiled a database of public 
media announcements of these FDI incidents using Lexis-Nexis search engines.  We also relied 
on Lexis-Nexis for public media announcements of the AD investigation events.8  We next used 
Federal Register notices to identify the U.S. domestic firms that were petitioners in the relevant 
AD cases with FDI, as well as petitioners in all other affirmative AD cases, and then used 
standard search engines to identify if these petitioning firms were publicly traded on U.S. stock 
markets.  Data on firms’ stock returns, as well as the market return, come from the Center for 
Research on Stock Prices (CRSP).    Table 1 lists the AD cases that involved tariff-jumping FDI 
and the associated publicly-traded petitioning firms.  Table 1 also shows the variety of final 
outcomes in these cases, with 16 of the 30 affirmative, 5 terminated or suspended, 5 negative, and 
4 mixed outcomes, where some of the investigated products received AD duties and others did 
not.  Again, in addition to the observations listed in Table 1, our sample includes all publicly-
traded firms involved in U.S. AD cases that went affirmative from 1980-1995, but saw no tariff-
jumping activity.  This leads to an additional 76 observations to the 62 listed in Table 1 and the 
list of such firms and associated cases is available from the authors upon request. 
 
3.2. Empirical Results. 
In stage-one regressions, we estimate 3-day CARs for all five types of AD investigation 
event decision dates: 1) petition, 2) preliminary USITC, 3) preliminary USDOC, 4) final USDOC, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
level. 
7 These data can be accessed at http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~bruceb/adpage.html or  
http://www.nber.org/antidump/. 
8 While Federal Register notices report AD investigation events, they do so with a lag.  The public announcements 
we found with Lexis-Nexis often predated the Federal Register notice dates by about 5-7 days.    
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and 5) final USITC decision.9   The top half of Table 2, column 1 gives the average CARs of 
these five events and a cumulated total CAR for all five events.  Following Borenstein and 
Zimmerman (1988), we construct a Z-statistic to analyze the statistical significance of these 
average CARs.  Assuming independent events, a Z-statistic can be constructed that is the sum of 
the t-statistics connected with each event divided by the square of the number of events.  This Z-
statistic is distributed as a normal variable with a variance equal to the number of observations 
and has the following formula: 
             
N
))VAR(CAR/(CAR
N
1n
nn∑
==Z                                                 (4) 
where CARn is the cumulative abnormal return for event (n), VAR indicates “variance” and N is 
the number of events.  This method of determining statistical significance has the advantage of 
controlling for observations with high standard errors, which get less weight in the Z-statistic.  
We report this Z-statistic in the second column of Table 2.10 
 The results in the top half of Table 2 show that the AD petition announcement is the one 
individual AD event that clearly leads to positive gains for firms, averaging about 1% of firm 
equity value.  The average CAR cumulated over all five AD events is also positive and 
statistically significant, with an average gain of 1.66%.  Thus, the AD events besides the petition 
also add to the gain to some extent, despite the fact that the average CARs for the preliminary and 
final decisions by the USDOC and USITC are close to zero in magnitude individually and not 
statistically significant.  There is substantial heterogeneity in these AD events.  For example, 
some cases end in negative AD decisions in our sample and, additionally, some affirmative 
                                                          
9 The number of firm-case observations varies by AD investigation events because of varying instances of non-
existent media announcements.  Below, we briefly describe results from using alternative event window lengths. 
10 In our case of cumulated totals of CARs from the five AD events, we first construct z-statistics over the five AD 
events for each firm-case observation and then construct a z-statistic over all case observations. 
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decisions yield much smaller dumping margins than others.  Our second stage regression analysis 
below will be able to examine this heterogeneity further.   
 Clearly, there is some support that domestic petitioning firms are receiving positive CARs 
from these AD investigations, with the mean CAR for all four of the five events positive and the 
cumulated total indicating around a 1.66% gain for these petitioning firms.  While this 1.66% 
average cumulated abnormal return is statistically significant, it is not very large in magnitude.  
One reason for this may be that there are some cases in our sample that were not ruled 
affirmative.  Another reason may be the mitigating effects of tariff-jumping FDI.   
To control for both of these concerns, the next three rows of Table 2 report the average 
cumulated CARs for petitioning firms involved in only affirmative AD cases, and then the 
breakdown of this sample into observations where no tariff-jumping FDI occurred and where 
tariff-jumping FDI did occur.  The average CAR goes up by limiting the sample to only 
affirmative AD cases (from 1.66% to 1.98%).  However, we also find a substantial difference in 
average CARs between the set of firm-case observations where there was tariff-jumping versus 
where there was not.  Those petitioning firms experiencing affirmative AD decisions and no 
tariff-jumping FDI by their foreign rivals average about a 3% gain, while those for which tariff-
jumping FDI occurs experience essentially no gains.  The Z-statistics for each of these groups 
indicates a statistically significant difference as well, with a Z-statistic of 12.14 for the group not 
experiencing tariff-jumping FDI and a Z-statistic of –0.19 for the group that does experience 
tariff-jumping FDI.  These results confirm our hypothesis that tariff-jumping FDI can mitigate the 
positive abnormal gains that U.S. domestic firms experience from AD trade protection.  In fact, it 
suggests that tariff-jumping FDI by foreign rivals completely eliminates such gains on average. 
The above comparison of means does not control for other relevant factors that may 
systematically affect CARs across our focus groups.  Thus, section 4 below employs second-stage 
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regression analysis of our estimated CARs to examine the effect of tariff-jumping FDI on firms’ 
gains from AD investigations, controlling for other factors. 
The last rows of Table 2 show the summary statistics for the CARs from all tariff-jumping 
FDI announcements, as well as a breakdown by the type of FDI indicated in the announcement 
(i.e., new plant, plant expansion, acquisition, or joint venture).  Our hypothesis is that tariff-
jumping FDI announcements should lead to losses for the domestic petitioning firms.  However, 
Table 3 shows that the mean CARs for all tariff-jumping announcements is 0.55%, though not 
statistically significant.   
The breakdown of mean CARs by FDI type provides some additional information.    The 
average CAR for plant expansion of existing foreign-owned plants is –1.20%, the average CAR 
for joint ventures is 1.78%, while average CARs for new plants and acquisitions is well below 
1%.  As mentioned earlier, tariff-jumping FDI may not be considered damaging to domestic firms 
if the foreign firm is unlikely to be as successful with domestic production as they were exporting 
to the U.S.  This may be why plant expansion announcements may be the only form to show 
correct sign:  These firms are already established in the U.S.  The positive joint venture sign may 
be due to the possibility of knowledge spillovers to the industry from joint ventures with foreign 
firms.  These average tariff-jumping CARs are generally not statistically significant (except for 
joint venture FDI at the 10% significance level), but also do not control for other factors, which 
we address in the next section with our second-stage estimation.     
 
4. Second Stage: Explaining the CARs. 
 The above analysis provided simple comparisons of means.  To more formally examine 
our hypotheses, this section presents a regression analysis of the various factors that may 
determine the CARs for these events.  Thus, we run second-stage OLS regressions of the form: 
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    CARij  =  φ  +  λ’Xij  +  µij,                                              (5) 
where φ is an intercept, Xij is a matrix of explanatory variables, λ is a vector of estimated 
parameters, and µij is an assumed normally-distributed error term.  Because our dependent 
variable is generated from our first-stage event study regressions, we use a White correction to 
adjust our standard errors for heteroskedasticity.11   
 
4.1. Explaining CARs from AD Announcements. 
 With respect to the second-stage regressions for the AD investigation announcements, our 
focus is the hypothesis that tariff-jumping FDI mitigates the gains domestic petitioners may 
experience from the AD case.  Thus, we first include a dummy variable that takes the value of “1” 
when an investigated foreign firm announces its intention to FDI in the investigated product prior 
to an AD event and expect a negative coefficient.  This captures known tariff-jumping FDI 
effects.  However, there may also be a higher expectation in some AD cases that tariff-jumping 
FDI may be announced subsequent to an AD event.  If the market can anticipate subsequent tariff-
jumping FDI to some extent, then such FDI observed ex post may also mitigate positive abnormal 
gains from affirmative AD decisions.  Thus, we include a dummy variable that takes the value of 
“1” for cases where tariff-jumping FDI is announced after the AD event and expect a negative 
coefficient as well. 
 We include other explanatory variables as controls.  First, positive abnormal gains are 
expected to be higher for AD investigation events the greater the amount of trade volume 
involved in the cases, particularly relative to the size of the petitioning firm(s).  Thus, we include 
the log of the dollar value of the subject import volume, expecting a positive coefficient, and the 
log of the dollar value of the petitioning firm’s sales in the relevant year, expecting a negative 
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sign.12  Additionally, a couple AD events yield unique quantifiable information that should affect 
the magnitude of the CARs for a firm.  For the second-stage regression explaining CARS at the 
preliminary USDOC decision, we include the preliminary AD duty (in decimal) form, expecting a 
larger duty to be associated with higher CARs.  At the final USDOC decision, an increase in the 
final dumping margin from the preliminary margin should also increase the CAR for this AD 
event, so we include the difference between the final and preliminary dumping margin (in decimal 
form) as an explanatory variable for second-stage regression of the CARs for the final USDOC 
decision.  Finally, provided the AD case has made it to the final USITC decision, this decision is 
definitive for the case and becomes the AD case’s final outcome.  Therefore, we include a dummy 
variable for whether the decision is affirmative or not in the second-stage regression for the final 
USITC decision CARs and expect a positive coefficient.13   
In any event study, there is always the possibility of other “confounding” announcements 
in the event window, which may bias the estimated CARs.  With so many different events in this 
study it is difficult to systematically control for these possibilities.  However, we hypothesize that 
the high profile 1985-86  semiconductor and 1992-93 steel cases are more likely to have such 
confounding events, as there were many media announcements connected with these cases 
throughout the time period of these AD cases.  Thus, we include separate dummy variables for 
these two types of cases in our second-stage AD event regressions.  Finally, we include year 
dummies and dummies for SIC industries 28, 33, 34, and 35, as unobserved macroeconomic 
conditions or industry characteristics may affect market investor’s reactions in a systematic way.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 We get qualitatively identical results when we control for heteroskedasticity as suggested by Saxonhouse (1976).  
Results using the Saxonhouse corrections are available from the authors upon request. 
12 Of course, a better measure of a firm’s “exposure” would use information on the petitioning firm’s market share 
in the investigated product, which is not available. 
13 Data for the subject import volume, case decision, and final AD duties can be accessed at 
http://www.nber.org/antidump/ or http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~bruceb/adpage.html.  Preliminary AD duties were 
collected from relevant Federal Register notices and data on petitioning firms’ sales volume come from the 
Compustat database. 
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These particular industry dummies are included since they encompass the bulk of U.S. AD 
cases.14  The top half of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for our explanatory variables in the 
second stage regressions for the sample of CARs cumulated over all five AD events. 
Table 4 presents our results from running separate regressions to explain CARs for the 
five AD events, as well as regression results for the cumulated total CAR.  The F-test for the final 
three AD events, as well as for the cumulated total CAR is statistically significant with R2s 
ranging from 0.16 to 0.32 for these cross-sectional regressions.   
There are a number of results in Table 4 to highlight.  First, consistent with comparison of 
means in Table 3, tariff-jumping FDI announcements are estimated to have a negative effect on a 
domestic firm’s gains from AD events.  FDI announcements that occur before the AD event (and 
thus represent almost certain tariff-jumping) are large and statistically significant, while the effect 
of tariff-jumping FDI that occurs after the event (a proxy for higher likelihood of tariff-jumping 
FDI at the time of the event) is smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant.  Second, 
explanatory power of this second-stage regression analysis is perhaps highest for the preliminary 
USDOC decision, where the magnitude of the duty is first revealed, with the size of the duty 
leading to larger CARs for petitioning firms and FDI before the event mitigating these gains by 
3.9%.  The cumulated total regression analysis likewise has decent explanatory power and is 
largely consistent with the separate regressions. In particular, FDI before the event continues to be 
strongly negative, while log of the petitioning firm’s sales is a statistically important control.  The 
high R2 in the final USITC regression seems to come primarily from the negative market reaction 
to the 1992-93 steel case, confirming press reports at the time that the ruling of negative on many 
of the products in that case was a blow to the U.S. steel industry and market expectations. 
  
                                                          
14 F-tests of the joint significance of the industry and year dummies were often, but not always statistically 
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4.2. Explaining CARs from Tariff-jumping FDI Announcements. 
We next turn to second-stage regressions connected with the CARs from tariff-jumping 
FDI announcements.  In particular, such a regression can indicate whether certain forms of FDI 
are more damaging to the domestic petitioning firms than others, controlling for other factors.  To 
examine this issue, we include dummy variables indicating whether the announced FDI will be a 
new plant, joint venture or plant expansion, excluding a dummy variable for acquisition FDI to 
avoid perfect multicollinearity.   
We also include dummy variables for whether the associated AD case was ruled 
affirmative or terminated/suspended, excluding a dummy variable for a negative decision.  
Consistent with our earlier hypotheses tested above, we expect that tariff-jumping FDI 
announcements lead to greater losses (negative coefficient) for the domestic firms that were 
successful in getting AD protection versus ones that did not receive such protection.  Terminated 
and suspended cases often lead to public or private settlements by the domestic and foreign firms, 
such as voluntary export agreements (see, for example, Prusa, 1992, and Anderson, 1993).  These 
outcomes may lead to positive CARs for domestic firms that may rival that of the proposed AD 
duties or, as shown by Rosendorff (1996), even higher profits for the domestic firms than with 
AD duties.  Given these arguments, we would also expect a negative coefficient on the 
terminated/suspended dummy variable. 
Another FDI-related explanatory variable that we include is a dummy variable for FDI 
before the investigation.  On the one hand, such pre-investigation FDI may be expected to have 
less impact on the domestic firm post-investigation FDI because the AD duties (or 
termination/suspension agreement) is not in place for such FDI announcements.  On the other 
hand, pre-investigation FDI may be by foreign firms that are much stronger rivals in the domestic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
significant for the regressions reported in Table 4. 
 18 
market, since they choose to FDI before any threat from an AD investigation and/or AD duties.  
This would suggest a negative coefficient on our pre-investigation FDI dummy variable. 
 Finally, as with our second-stage regression analysis of the AD announcements, we 
include the log of the dollar value of the subject import volume, the log of the dollar value of the 
petitioning firm’s sales in the relevant year, and dummy variables for the 1985-86 semiconductor 
cases and 1992-93 steel cases as controls.  We do not include year and industry dummies in these 
regressions as F-tests reject their inclusion though we get qualitatively identical results to those 
reported here when they are included.  The bottom half of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for 
our explanatory variables in the second-stage regressions of the tariff-jumping FDI sample. 
Table 5 presents our results for the tariff-jumping FDI announcements.  The first column 
of  results gives estimates when using the entire sample of observations.  Many of the regressors 
have the correct sign, and the F-test rejects the null of jointly zero slopes at the 1% significance 
level.   As hypothesized, tariff-jumping events lead to more negative CARs when the final 
outcome of the associated AD case was affirmative, though this effect is not statistically 
significant at standard significance levels.  Terminated/suspended cases do not appear to have any 
statistically significant impact on the CARs from tariff-jumping.   
Turning to our FDI variables, there is evidence that plant expansion FDI lead to more 
negative CARs than other types of FDI, with a 4.3% lower CAR, everything else equal.  This 
makes sense because plant expansions add domestic capacity in the industry, unlike acquisitions, 
and are by foreign firms that have already established themselves in the domestic market, unlike 
new plants or joint ventures.   
The last column of Table 5 displays results when we run our second-stage regressions for 
only our affirmative outcome observations.  Since this sample is only affirmative cases, we must 
necessarily drop the first two regressors for identification.  In general, this regression does not 
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have as good of a fit.  However, the results are largely consistent with the full sample results in 
column 1.  One difference is that plant expansion and new plant FDI are now both estimated to 
negatively impact domestic petitioners.   Another notable difference is that FDI before the 
investigation is now found to significantly lead to lower returns for domestic petitioners, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that it is generally foreign firms that can compete stronger 
domestically that announce before AD investigations. 
On a final note, when we examine event windows of 1, 5, 7 and 9 days (rather than 3 days 
reported here), we get qualitatively identical results, though less precisely estimated.  This is true 
for both our second-stage regressions for AD and for tariff-jumping announcements and is 
consistent with the notion that a larger window allows the possibility of greater noise from 
confounding events. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 This paper began with the idea of examining changes in domestic firms profits from AD 
investigations and from the subsequent tariff-jumping FDI that may result from such actions.  The 
initial hypotheses were that AD investigations, particularly those that are ruled affirmative and 
lead to AD duties, result in positive abnormal returns to domestic firms, while tariff-jumping FDI 
may partially or completely mitigate these effects.   The sample we gathered showed substantial 
heterogeneity in the circumstances surrounding AD cases with associated FDI, including a variety 
of case outcomes, timing of FDI and type of FDI.  This led to a variety of hypotheses tested 
concerning the variation in abnormal returns we observe from the AD investigation and tariff-
jumping events. 
We find evidence that FDI has a significant negative impact on abnormal gains from AD 
investigation events for U.S. domestic petitioning firms.  On average, affirmative U.S. AD 
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decisions are associated with 3% abnormal gains to a petitioning firm when there is no tariff-
jumping FDI, but no abnormal gains if there is tariff-jumping FDI.  The evidence for this effect is 
strong when announcements of the intended tariff-jumping FDI have already occurred before the 
AD event takes place, which happened in a fair number of cases, while there is weaker evidence 
for this effect with anticipated subsequent FDI announcements.   
In a related vein, we find evidence that the announcements of plant expansions (and, to 
some extent, new plants) have significantly larger negative effects on domestic firms’ profits than 
other types of FDI, including acquisitions and joint ventures.  This makes sense because plant 
expansions add domestic capacity in the industry, unlike acquisitions, and are by foreign firms 
that have already established themselves in the domestic market, unlike joint ventures.   
Our analysis also highlights that market reactions are significantly more marked for some 
AD events than others.  Our ability to explain market reactions (in terms of R2) is highest for the 
preliminary USDOC decision where the proposed AD duty is first announced, and the final 
USITC decision where the final case outcome is resolved.15  Finally, the negative decision on 
some of the products involved in the 1992-93 steel cases, one of the largest set of AD cases ever 
investigated in the U.S. led to significantly negative abnormal returns to the U.S. steel petitioners. 
  
                                                          
15 The preliminary USDOC decision is often not the focus of event studies of AD decisions, though Hughes et al. 
(1997) also find that the preliminary USDOC announcement for the U.S. AD case against Japan in 64k drams had 
very large effects on the market. 
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Figure 1: Standard Timeline for U.S. AD Investigations. 
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Table 1: U.S. AD Cases with Tariff-jumping FDI and U.S. Domestic Petitioners that were 
Publicly-traded Firms at Time of the AD Case. 
USITC 
Case 
Number 
 
Year of 
Petition 
 
Publicly Traded 
Petitioners 
 
 
Product 
 
Case 
Decisionf 
 
731012 
 
1980 
 
SCM Corp. 
 
Portable Electronic Typewriters 
 
A 
731053-
731084 
1982 Bethlehem Steel Corp. 
US Steel Corp. 
Carbon Steel Products N,T 
731089 1982 ARMCO Steel Co. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp. 
Concrete Wire Strand T 
731095 1982 ARMCO Steel Co. 
Allegheny Ludlum 
Carpenter Technology  
Colt Industries 
Cyclops Corp. 
Eastern Stainless Steel 
Republic Steel Corp. 
Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip A 
731102 1982 Motorola Inc. Radio Pagers A 
731134 1983 Corning Glass Works 
Owens Illinois Corp. 
Wells-Gardner Electric  
Color TV Receivers A 
731207 1984 Motorola Inc. Cellular Mobile Telephones A 
731270 1985 Micron Technology  64k DRAMs A 
731288 1985 Advanced Micro Devices 
Intel Corp. 
National Semiconductor  
EPROMs T 
731300a 1985 Advanced Micro Devices 
Intel Corp. 
National Semiconductor  
256k and above DRAMs  T 
731343 1986 Timken Corp. Tapered Roller Bearings A 
731350-
731353 
1986 Wyman-Gordon Forged Steel Crankshafts A,N,T 
731354 1986 ARMCO Steel Co. 
Allegheny Ludlum 
Carpenter Technology  
Stainless Steel Pipe A 
731368 1986 Zenith Electronics Color Picture Tubes A 
731370 1987 Caterpillarb Forklifts A 
731388 1988 Polaris Industries All-terrain Vehicles N 
731389 1988 Eastman Kodakc 3.5 Inch Floppy Disks A 
731391-
731399 
1988 Ingersoll Rand Corp.d Ball Bearings A 
731426 1988 AT&T Corp. 
Comdial Corp. 
Small Business Telephones A 
731429 1989 Allied Productse Mechanical Transfer Press A 
731451 1989 Ideal Basic Industries 
Texas Industries 
Portland Cement A 
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731490 1990 Boise Cascade 
Bowater Inc. 
Champion International 
Consolidated Papers 
International Paper 
Coated Groundwood Paper N 
731522 1991 Chrysler Motor Corp. 
Ford Motor Corp. 
General Motors Corp. 
Minivans N 
731556 1992 Micron Technology DRAMs A 
731557 1992 Bethlehem Steel Corp. Steel Rails N 
731571 1992 Black & Decker Corp. Professional Electric Handtools A,N 
731573-
731620 
1992 ARMCO Steel Co. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp. 
Geneva Steel Corp. 
LaClede Steel Corp. 
LTV Corp. 
Lukens Steel Corp. 
US Steel Corp. 
Steel Products A,N 
731622 1992 DuPont 
Hercules Inc. 
Morton International 
Dry Film PhotoResist N 
731647 1993 Keystone Consolidated Carbon Steel Wire Rod T 
731661 1993 Eastman Kodak Photo Paper and Chemicals T 
a Petition actually initiated by U.S. government through the Department of Commerce, but largely 
connected with case 731-288, so we assign the same firms as “petitioners” in this case. 
b Petition filed by the labor unions connected with Caterpillar Inc. 
c Petition by Verbatim Corp., a subsidiary of Eastman Kodak. 
d Petition by Torrington Corp., a subsidiary of Ingersoll Rand Corp. 
e Petition by Verson Corp., a subsidiary of Allied Products. 
f “A” represents “Affirmative”, “N” represents “Negative”, “T” represents “Terminated” or 
“Suspended” often in terms of a negotiated voluntary export restraint agreement. In some cases, 
with multiple countries or products named, there may be more than one decision listed. 
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Table 2: Summary of First-Stage Regressions for AD Investigations and Tariff-jumping 
Events. 
 
 
Event 
 
Mean 
CARs 
 
 
Z-statistic 
 
Number of 
CARs 
 
AD Events  
 
Petition 
 
 
 
0.0105 
 
 
 
   2.17* 
 
 
 
130 
Preliminary USITC Decision 0.0024  0.40 127 
Preliminary USDOC Decision 0.0023 -0.19 126 
Final USDOC Decision 0.0060  0.97 115 
Final USITC Decision     -0.0001  0.83 119 
Cumulated Total 
 
0.0166      7.61** 132 
AD Events - Affirmative Cases Only    
 
Cumulated Total  
 
0.0198 
 
      9.95** 
 
  99 
Cumulated Total – With Tariff-jumping FDI 0.0019 -0.19   31 
Cumulated Total – Without Tariff-jumping FDI 
 
0.0296    12.14**   68 
Tariff-jumping Events 
 
All Tariff-jumping FDI Announcements 
 
 
0.0055 
 
 
 1.39 
 
 
160 
   New Plant FDI 0.0033  0.60   77 
   Acquisition FDI 0.0078  0.74   25 
   Plant Expansion FDI     -0.0120 -0.71   20 
   Joint Venture FDI 0.0178    1.92*   38 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Second-Stage Regressions. 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
AD Cumulated Total Events (138 
observations) 
 
Log of Subject Import Volume (in $ millions) 
 
 
 
2.34 
 
 
 
0.26 
 
 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
2.70 
Log of Petitioning Firm’s Sales (in $ millions) 1.94 0.23 1.16 2.46 
Preliminary Duty (in decimals) 0.42 0.58 0.00 4.44 
Final Duty – Preliminary Duty (in decimals)     -0.09 0.48     -3.60 1.63 
FDI Before 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
FDI After 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Semiconductor Case 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
1992-93 Steel Case 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Affirmative Decision 0.79 0.39 0.00 1.00 
     
Tariff-jumping Events (160 observations) 
 
Log of Subject Import Volume (in $ millions) 
 
 
2.56 
 
 
0.14 
 
 
2.07 
 
 
2.70 
Log of Petitioning Firm’s Sales (in $ millions) 2.01 0.19 1.21 2.48 
FDI Before Investigation 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
New Plant FDI 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Joint Venture FDI  0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Plant Expansion FDI 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
1992-93 Steel Case 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Semiconductor Case 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Affirmative Decision 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Terminated/Suspended 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
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Table 4: Second-Stage Regressions for AD Investigation Events – White-corrected Standard 
Errors. 
 
Dependent Variable: CARs with 3-day Event Window 
 
 
 
 
 
Regressors 
 
Expect-
ed 
Sign 
 
 
Petition 
 
Preliminary 
USITC 
 
Preliminary 
USDOC 
 
Final 
USDOC 
 
Final 
USITC 
 
Cumulated 
Total 
 
Log of Subject 
Import Volume  
 
+ 
 
     0.002 
   (0.026) 
 
 
  - 0.017 
   (0.018) 
 
 
 0.026 
(0.021) 
 
 
 0.017 
(0.024) 
 
 
   - 0.024 
(0.023) 
 
 
   - 0.023 
(0.029) 
 
Log of Petition 
Firm’s Sales  
-    - 0.002  
(0.034) 
 
     0.012  
   (0.027) 
 
   - 0.045 
(0.028) 
 
   - 0.082** 
(0.028) 
 
   - 0.026 
(0.029) 
 
  - 0.088** 
   (0.037) 
 
Preliminary 
Duty 
 
+    
 
   
 
    0.022**  
(0.010) 
     
 
       
 
  - 0.001 
   (0.027)    
 
Final Duty – 
Preliminary 
Duty 
+       - 0.000 
(0.008) 
   - 0.007 
   (0.026) 
FDI Before 
Event 
 
_   - 0.051* 
   (0.027) 
  - 0.024 
   (0.017) 
  - 0.039** 
   (0.017) 
     0.005 
   (0.017) 
  - 0.015 
   (0.025) 
  - 0.080* 
   (0.041) 
FDI After Event 
 
 
_   - 0.023 
   (0.016) 
  - 0.009 
   (0.012) 
  - 0.021 
   (0.015) 
     0.013 
   (0.016) 
  - 0.012 
   (0.018) 
  - 0.034 
   (0.038) 
Semiconductor 
Case 
 
?     0.028 
   (0.037) 
0.013 
   (0.025) 
    0.025 
   (0.023) 
  - 0.073 
   (0.056) 
  - 0.021 
   (0.049) 
    0.002 
   (0.055) 
1992-93 Steel 
Case 
 
?     0.024 
   (0.032) 
0.024  
   (0.047) 
    0.103 
   (0.081) 
  - 0.010 
   (0.031) 
  - 0.109** 
   (0.049) 
  - 0.040 
   (0.073) 
Affirmative 
Decision 
 
+       - 0.017 
   (0.030) 
  - 0.003  
   (0.051) 
 
 
 
 
       
R2   0.18 0.16  0.32  0.30  0.37  0.31 
F-statistic  0.86 1.41     1.63**  277.57**     3.00**     1.70** 
Number of 
Observations 
  124  122  120  107  114  138 
NOTES: Robust (White-corrected) standard errors in parentheses.  Year and industry dummies included, 
where industry dummies are for SIC 28, 33, 34 and 35, the sectors with the majority of AD activity.           
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level and ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.  
For the “Cumulated Total” regression, the variable “FDI Before Event” is replaced with a dummy variable 
for FDI taking place before final USITC decision and, similarly, “FDI After Event” is defined as FDI after 
final USITC decision.
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Table 5: Second-Stage Regressions for Tariff-Jumping Events. 
 
Dependent Variable: CARs with 3-day Event Window 
 
 
 
 
 
Regressors 
 
Expected 
Sign 
 
All  
Observations 
 
Affirmative 
Decisions Only 
 
Log of Subject Import Volume  
 
 
 
- 
           
            0.026 
(0.042) 
           
             0.054 
(0.068) 
Log of Petition Firm’s Sales  
 
 
+           - 0.033 
(0.028) 
          - 0.005 
(0.038) 
FDI Before Investigation 
 
 
?           - 0.010 
(0.012) 
          - 0.024* 
(0.013)  
New Plant FDI 
 
 
_           - 0.001 
(0.014) 
          - 0.054** 
(0.022) 
Joint Venture FDI 
 
 
_             0.020 
(0.017) 
          - 0.024 
(0.031) 
Plant Expansion FDI 
 
 
_          - 0.043** 
    (0.018) 
         - 0.076** 
    (0.034) 
1992-93 Steel Case 
 
 
?          - 0.025   
          (0.018)  
         - 0.028   
          (0.023)  
Semiconductor Case 
 
 
?            0.016 
          (0.018) 
           0.022 
          (0.027) 
Affirmative Decision 
 
 
-          - 0.019  
          (0.012) 
 
 
Terminated/Suspended 
 
 
-            0.014 
          (0.027) 
 
R2  0.08 0.10 
F-statistic      2.05** 0.99 
Number of Observations   160    81 
NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * denotes statistical significance at the 10% 
level, and ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
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